genders, values, norms
in the two weeks since my last post, i've had the good fortune of participating in several interesting conversations about gender. there were also some interesting things said in the comments on the last post. furthermore, i have been trying to do some more thinking on my own about the topic. in spite of all this, however, i'm still mostly at a loss for what to say on these issues.
in her comment on the last post, natalie expressed some skepticism about giving 'gendered' descriptions of the virtues. i share this skepticism. she asks: "where would such a description come from? and how would you protect against these lists being used normatively (as, historically, they always have)?" i think her concern about normativity may be instructive. in one sense, what i am trying to imagine is precisely a normative description of 'maleness' and 'femaleness', insofar as the description i am interested in is value-laden, and would play a role in our grammar of human excellence. i think we can distinguish this (general, vague) sense of normative from a sense of normative that conveys something like 'this is the only acceptable way of proceeding' or 'this is the best way of being.' i take it that natalie's primary concern is that gendered descriptions would be normative in the second sense.
a central worry about this kind of normativity has to do with saying that an excellence is both gender-specific and an expression of humanness. in particular, if we think of a certain trait as being expressive of 'masculinity', and also of that trait expressing something important about human excellence, then there seems to be some pressure to conceive of 'femininity' in a way that characterizes women as somehow less than fully human. i have in the mind the following sort of example:
i find in myself an association between a certain ideal of 'manliness' and decisiveness. (i am not saying i consciously endorse this ideal, but no doubt it exerts some influence on me). behind the value of decisiveness is, i think, the value of a kind of self-direction -the value of being not merely the subject of forces acting on oneself, but rather the origin of action. and what is involved in this kind of self-direction is closely connected to, or perhaps is even constitutive of, what goes into being an agent. to be self-directed, we might say, just is what it means to be a person; if one were fully the subject of forces, one would not be a self at all. now, if decisiveness is connected to 'manliness' then we seem dangerously close to an unwelcome implication: 'womanliness', especially if it is conceived as somehow the mirror image of manliness, may involve something less than being a full agent or self. of course, what corresponds to 'manly decisiveness' will probably not be described as 'womanly indecisiveness', but it may well be described in terms of 'receptivity' or 'passivity'. and the worry is that such descriptions push us toward regarding womanliness as expressing something less than full humanness, toward regarding women as less than full selves.
with these concerns about gender and normativity in mind, i have been trying to think about other ways of describing and evaluating value and may give some direction as to how to think about gender in a way that is value-laden but avoids such pitfalls. perhaps the case of architecture will be helpful. in describing various buildings, we can evaluate them with an eye toward their style or period. and it seems that different terms of praise will be characteristic of different style. for example, we may say that a certain gothic cathedral is ornate and grand, or that a particular church in the romanesque style is elegantly simple and quietly sturdy. interestingly, different terms can be ways of praising different buildings, even if the qualities they pick out are incompatible -e.g. we might praise one building for its lavishness and another for its sparseness. both of descriptions, however, are value-laden and both are positive. both pick out something of excellence and beauty in design and construction of the building. in the case of architecture, diverse and incompatible qualities can all express and embody value.
unfortunately, i'm not sure how to apply this example of value to the question of gender. nevertheless, there are several features of the case i find interesting. one is the way that the judgments of value are made relative to a particular style or period, and yet the judgments are all about the beauty of buildings -there are significantly differences in the standards of excellence, but it isn't that the subject has simply been changed. another interesting point is that we have no problem saying that architectural styles and periods were formed by historical and cultural forces, but recognizing that doesn't cause them to lose their value. we don't think the 'constructed-ness' of architectural styles and standards someone calls into question their beauty or value. i wonder if there isn't a hint here for thinking about gender that is neither 'essentialist' nor merely biological.
in her comment on the last post, natalie expressed some skepticism about giving 'gendered' descriptions of the virtues. i share this skepticism. she asks: "where would such a description come from? and how would you protect against these lists being used normatively (as, historically, they always have)?" i think her concern about normativity may be instructive. in one sense, what i am trying to imagine is precisely a normative description of 'maleness' and 'femaleness', insofar as the description i am interested in is value-laden, and would play a role in our grammar of human excellence. i think we can distinguish this (general, vague) sense of normative from a sense of normative that conveys something like 'this is the only acceptable way of proceeding' or 'this is the best way of being.' i take it that natalie's primary concern is that gendered descriptions would be normative in the second sense.
a central worry about this kind of normativity has to do with saying that an excellence is both gender-specific and an expression of humanness. in particular, if we think of a certain trait as being expressive of 'masculinity', and also of that trait expressing something important about human excellence, then there seems to be some pressure to conceive of 'femininity' in a way that characterizes women as somehow less than fully human. i have in the mind the following sort of example:
i find in myself an association between a certain ideal of 'manliness' and decisiveness. (i am not saying i consciously endorse this ideal, but no doubt it exerts some influence on me). behind the value of decisiveness is, i think, the value of a kind of self-direction -the value of being not merely the subject of forces acting on oneself, but rather the origin of action. and what is involved in this kind of self-direction is closely connected to, or perhaps is even constitutive of, what goes into being an agent. to be self-directed, we might say, just is what it means to be a person; if one were fully the subject of forces, one would not be a self at all. now, if decisiveness is connected to 'manliness' then we seem dangerously close to an unwelcome implication: 'womanliness', especially if it is conceived as somehow the mirror image of manliness, may involve something less than being a full agent or self. of course, what corresponds to 'manly decisiveness' will probably not be described as 'womanly indecisiveness', but it may well be described in terms of 'receptivity' or 'passivity'. and the worry is that such descriptions push us toward regarding womanliness as expressing something less than full humanness, toward regarding women as less than full selves.
with these concerns about gender and normativity in mind, i have been trying to think about other ways of describing and evaluating value and may give some direction as to how to think about gender in a way that is value-laden but avoids such pitfalls. perhaps the case of architecture will be helpful. in describing various buildings, we can evaluate them with an eye toward their style or period. and it seems that different terms of praise will be characteristic of different style. for example, we may say that a certain gothic cathedral is ornate and grand, or that a particular church in the romanesque style is elegantly simple and quietly sturdy. interestingly, different terms can be ways of praising different buildings, even if the qualities they pick out are incompatible -e.g. we might praise one building for its lavishness and another for its sparseness. both of descriptions, however, are value-laden and both are positive. both pick out something of excellence and beauty in design and construction of the building. in the case of architecture, diverse and incompatible qualities can all express and embody value.
unfortunately, i'm not sure how to apply this example of value to the question of gender. nevertheless, there are several features of the case i find interesting. one is the way that the judgments of value are made relative to a particular style or period, and yet the judgments are all about the beauty of buildings -there are significantly differences in the standards of excellence, but it isn't that the subject has simply been changed. another interesting point is that we have no problem saying that architectural styles and periods were formed by historical and cultural forces, but recognizing that doesn't cause them to lose their value. we don't think the 'constructed-ness' of architectural styles and standards someone calls into question their beauty or value. i wonder if there isn't a hint here for thinking about gender that is neither 'essentialist' nor merely biological.
posted by micah at 5:01 PM
2 Comments:
You raise an interesting question about aesthetic evaluation. And while I think you're very right to say that a lot of our aesthetic judgments are indexed (albeit implicitly) to certain styles, contexts, times etc., I think this is just one of two competing intutions. For while it seems undeniable that context can make all the difference in aesthetic judgments, it also seems like we want to be able to say something about what contexts are valuable. This might seem silly when choosing between two very accomplished styles (in what sense is Art Deco better than Beaux Art? Well it's certainly not a senseless question and a lot of people, myself included, have a preference. But lets leave this aside), but surely it's not so silly when we want to say that certain styles simply aren't good. In the extreme, we can imagne a case where I invent my own style that's just absurd. The point is, not all aesthetic judgments are going to be internal to a certain style, since we need to able to make aesthetic judgments about styles in general. And I think a similar problem besets the kind of account of virtue you're after, at least in the case of gender. Lets just assume (and this is a BIG assumption that no one would want to grant without a lot argument) that there is something about the genders such that what counts as an excellence in the context of one gender isn't necessarily an excellence in the context of the other. It still seems perfectly sensible to say, "Yes, I see given the constraints imposed by the nature of the gender that *that* counts as an excellence-for-gender-X. But that doesn't tell me anything about whether the gender itself is valuable. That is, it doesn't close the question "Wouldn't it better if the thing were different?" It seems like we definitely want to say this kind of thing about different species - there is excellence for a plant; there is excellence for a human; and there is a perfectly intelligible way of wondering whether it's better to be human or a plant. At least I think there is.
On another note, I'm interested in your worry about having virtues be both gender specific and human excellences. Leaving gender aside, isn't it the case that we don't want all the excellences to be something that we could all have? Or to put the point differently, we don't want it to be the case that what makes a person valuable are those features that express their humanity at the most general level, since we tend to value people for their idiosyncrasies as much as anything else - you're my friend because of certain features that make you "Micah" and not because of general features that anyone could have. Is your concern relevant here too? That is, does your concern to keep virtues at a sufficiently general level such that anyone could have them (and is there a further premise that this is *all* we find valuable in people?) cut against the kind of individuality in friendship. love etc. that we value so much?
DG
thanks, dan, for your comments. on your last point: i find myself wanting to say that what we value in a person -that is, what find beautiful, good, precious, worthy of respect- is something like the particular and unique expression of something universal. so, it is not just sam's "humanity" that i value when i value sam, but somehow the things i do value in sam are expressions of his humanity, and the fact that they are expressions of his humanity structures how and why i value them.
in the case of friendship and love, i think the uniqueness we value is often tied to how this person has played a role in my life -the unique history that we have together, the special part they play (and have played) in the story of my life.
but i think we can (and should) value the uniqueness even in strangers. and that uniqueness is bound up with the irreplacability of every person. so, we would be missing something if we looked at a stranger and so only "instance of human being"; we would be missing something even if we valued or respected the stranger as a human being.
i actually think there is a great mystery here: this uniqueness of each person, this singleness.
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