Sunday, September 25, 2005

how to think about what is in the womb

thanks to everyone for the excellent comments and for making this a good discussion.

in thinking about the morality of abortion, i find myself wanting to say two things:

1) it is impossible to begin to think rightly about abortion without dealing with the question of what this thing is which that gets aborted. it is fairly obvious, i think, that an abortion destroys something, and also that the moral status of abortion depends heavily on the nature of whatever is destroyed. hence the conflict about what to call whatever is in the womb -to destroy a 'bunch of cells' or even a 'fetus' seems very different from destroying 'an unborn child' or a 'baby in the womb.

2) there is something wrong-headed and unproductive about centering our thinking about abortion on questions like 'when does a human life begin?' or 'when is a fetus a person?' these seem to me especially vexed questions, and i am skeptical of starting with the most difficult questions. moreover, these questions seem to take us into fairly abstract debates about personal identity, and to lead us away from some of our most helpful moral concepts -concepts such as virtue and vice, human activities and human goods.

a friend recently pointed out to me that these two points might stand in tension: how can we deal with the first issue -the status of what is in the womb- without dealing with precisely those questions of which i am wary? i offer the following line of thought as a response to that question, and as a suggestion for how we might begin to think about what is in the womb in a way that doesn't start with a question such as 'when does a human life begin?':

most people, it seems, feel that abortion is more objectionable the later it occurs in a pregnancy. the pro-choice case is much harder to make when what is in the womb is something that looks and acts so much like a baby, and perhaps could even survive outside of the womb. likewise, the pro-life case is harder to make when we are talking about the very early stages of a pregnancy, when what is aborted doesn't look or act much like a baby. so as not to start with a case that seems to stake the deck too much for either side, let us begin with a pregnancy at 8 weeks gestation. about 88% of abortion in american take place between 6-12 weeks gestation, and about half take place at 8 weeks or later.

at 8 weeks, this thing in the womb is about 3/4 of an inch long. it has a heartbeat and brainwaves. it has arms, legs, fingers and toes. and it moves around on its own. you can see a nice picture of it here.

now, what should we call such a thing? it seems fairly clear that, whatever it is, it is alive. it seems equally obvious that whatever it is, it is human -it certainly is not some other life form, such as a plant or non-human animal. is it a human person? is it a fully human? these are much trickier questions, in part because the nature of personhood and personal identity is much debated. let us set these question aside, then, and not insist either way about the question of personhood. what is plain, i think, is that this is a form of human life at the very early stages of development. whether we wish to refer to it as a 'fetus' or an 'unborn child', then, what is in the womb at 8 weeks is clearly a developing human being. this strikes me as an obvious and non-contentious way to get clear about what we are dealing with. after all, if it is not a developing human being, what else could it possibly be?

having said that what is in the womb is a developing human being, we have not had to answer any questions such as 'when does human life begin?' or 'what constitutes personhood?'. moreover, we have not yet said anything about how we ought to respond to a developing human being. nor have we said anything about the rights or interests of either developing human beings or pregnant women who are carrying them.

however, by recognizing that we are dealing with is a developing human being, i think we are now in better shape to start asking the right sort of questions, such as: what are our responsibilities to developing human beings? what place to human beings at the very early stages of development have in the community of other human beings? what is the proper response for an adult human being to have toward a developing human being?

likewise, we can ask: what virtues might come into play in helping us this about our posture toward developing human beings? how does our attitude toward developing human beings reflect our understanding of what does it mean to live well as a human being? how to it reflect and our understanding of the specifically human needs, capabilities, and excellences?

Wednesday, September 21, 2005

the psychology of the abortion debate

as i suggested in my last post, i think that pro-lifers ought to remember that their long term goal is not to change the courts, or even the laws, with respect to abortion. rather, the true goal is to change the attitudes and decision-making of individuals, such that abortion becomes something people choose not to do, perhaps even something unthinkable. this is not to say, of course, that courts and laws will play no role in this, but that their role might not be as big as many people (both pro-life and pro-choice) seem to think.

the idea that such a change is possible no doubt seems naive to many people, probably most people even. nevertheless, that seems to me to be the goal, and i see no reason why pro-lifers should lose their nerve or despair.

in attempting to bring about such change, one thing that pro-lifers will need to do is think more seriously about the psychology, and not just the morality, of abortion. in the past, many pro-lifers seem to have allowed fervency of ethical conviction to substitute for astuteness of psychological observation. the psychology of abortion is important with respect to both: 1) why and how people choose to have an abortion, or encourage others to do so, and 2) how people reason and debate about the morality of abortion. setting aside #1 for now, here are a few observations about the psychology of the abortion debate and some of its unique features:

1) many american women have had abortions. the pro-choice group, national abortion federation, reports on their website that: "If current rates continue, it is estimated that 35% of all women of reproductive age in America today will have had an abortion by the time they reach the age of 45." this means that most all of us know someone who has had an abortion, perhaps someone very close to us. perhaps we have had an abortion, or encouraged someone else to have one. and this means that it will be very difficult for many of us to say that we think abortion is wrong. it is hard to accept that one has done something wrong, or that one's mother or father or sister or brother has done something wrong. it important for pro-lifers to recognize, then, that for many people to admit that one ought not have an abortion is not to make just another concession in a discussion, but to admit something very difficult about oneself or one's loved ones.

2) related to the first point, the sheer prevalance of abortion means that many people who we would otherwise consider to be fine, decent people have had abortions. for this reason alone, it may be hard for us to consider abortion a serious wrong: after all, how could so many kind, thoughtful people do something that was very bad? this point is made even stronger when we recognize that the core reason why abortion is wrong -because it is the destruction of a human life (or, if you prefer, a developing human life)- is such that, if abortion is wrong, it would seem to be a very grave and serious wrong. by the very nature of the case, it is hard to see how one could formulate the pro-life position in such a way as to make abortion a minor wrong, something that one could easily forget about. this makes it all the more difficult, then, to admit that abortion is wrong at all: surely so many decent people couldn't do something that bad, could they? of course, i don' think this stands up particularly well as an argument; history is full of otherwise decent people doing bad things on a large scale, whether those bad things were minor or truly heinous (e.g. slavery, subjugation of women). still, there is something to this point and this way of reasoning, and pro-lifers would do well to take it seriously and address it.

3) as lisa pointed out in her comment, many people are no 'pro-life' or 'pro-choice' as a matter of the subculture into which they were raised. to be pro-life or pro-choice is part of a package deal that might include being republican or democrat, catholic or evangelical or agnostic, rural or urban, etc. thus for many people, the idea of being 'pro-life' carries with it a host of negative associations and a variety of other moral and political commitments. and that means that being pro-life is something that many people haven't even considered, something that is not on their radar screen. it also means that many people will be resistant to adopting a pro-life view not so much because of specific arguments about abortion, but because of their opposition to other things which they associate with the pro-life view, such as being religious or anti-feminist or pro free market. any many people will be pro-choice out of an even vaguer sense that 'this is the kind of person i am.'


i wish that i had something more constructive to say about how an appreciation of these factors might shape a pro-life strategy, or at least contribute positively to the abortion debate. but, i think i will leave it at this for now.

Wednesday, September 14, 2005

let's talk about abortion

in my last post, i noted the strangely undemocratic way that certain debates -such as abortion- get played out in the supreme court, thus creating the impression (if not the reality) that the lives of millions are in the hands of very few. upon further reflection, i am inclined to say that what is strange about the current situation is not just the undemocratic nature of the supreme court, but also the way in which the court has now become so politicized. as i understand it, the court's undemocratic nature is meant to work in tandem with it being above the fray of legislative politics; its unique power is meant to be balanced by a unique objectivity and a unique disinterest. what is odd about the current situation, however, is that supreme court appointees seem increasingly to be treated as political players, and thus the court gets drawn into the political fray, while still retaining its undemocratic powers. it is at this point that the situation seems odd: after all, if there is debate and disagreement over issues, then let's debate and disagree and vote and make laws, rather than spend so much of our energies to acheive our ends in a back-door way by trying to get our people onto the court.

and the point here is not that the court hasn't and won't do good things, or that the δεμος is especially reliable. rather, the point is about the way in which we believe that decisions ought to be made in a democracy, and how the mode (not just the result) of the decisions does (or does not) reflect our self-understanding and commitments as a democracy (or, democratic republic if you prefer). perhaps this will seem naive and 'un-political' to many, but i am unsure about the end-justifies-the-means reasoning that seems to be accepted by many people of good will with respect to the court.

that said, i also suggest that those of us who believe that abortion is wrong have special reasons to avoid a situation in which the supreme court distracts us from a broader discussion of abortion. the core of those reasons is this: 1) we (pro-lifers) are chiefly interested in women not having abortions, and in not doing so for the right reasons. 2) we do not need a supreme court decision for this to happen, and it is not even clear what impact a supreme court decision would have in this regard. 3) we have the best arguments in the debate; our is the position with the clearest and most compelling reasons.

what follows from these points is that we who oppose abortion ought to resist anything that will table an actual discussion of the practice and morality of abortion, even if that thing is a discussion of abortion and the courts. we ought to try to get people to talk about abortion, to consider the nature of the situation, to examine critically the positions of both sides. and we ought to do this with the hope that, eventually, our position will win acceptance among many people, including many women who might otherwise have decided to have an abortion. we ought always to remember that our goal is not a supreme court decision, but a sea-change in people's thinking and attitudes about abortion -just as our country has had not only a series of political decisions about race, but a phenomenal shift in mindset and orientation (not to say, of course, that this shift is perfect or complete).

one organization that seems to be engaging in just the sort of debate i am commending is feminists for life.

of course, if our actual goal is to reduce the number of abortions, and to do so for the right reasons, what is needed is not only debate but action on a number of fronts -e.g. providing financial support for pregnant women without means to support a child, offering flexible schedules and childcare so that women will not have to choose between a child and a career, etc. in this post i have focused on the importance of debate and discussion as something of unique value for the issue of abortion, but not of exclusive value, and certainly not at the exclusion of other pro-life activities (which, of course, may well form a type of argument in their own way)

Saturday, September 10, 2005

democracy, abortion and the supreme court

following discussions of the lovely topics of beauty and friendship, a return to the world of politics:


after the recent death of the chief justice rehnquist, there has been renewed concern and speculation about president bush's second supreme court nominee. with regard to any number of controversial issues, many people on all sides seem convinced that bush's decision is tremendously important, possibly more important than anything else bush will do during this term in office. because of the close nature of many of the courts decisions, it is argued that whoever is appointed to the court may well transform our legal rights and our way of life for years to come.

perhaps no one feels this way more than those fearful that the supreme court may one day overturn its decision in roe v. wade, thus taking away the court's protection of a woman's legal right to an abortion. to hear many pro-choice advocates tell the story, the person who will replace justice o'conner will single-handedly determine the fate of women's rights (and lives) in america. likewise, many pro-lifers seem to feel the same way: that the life or death of thousands, even millions, of unborn children may be determined by whomever bush appoints to the court.

surely some of this talk is an attempt by each side to galvanize their base, a way of mobilizing energy for the political fight over the next appointee by convincing their fellow combatants of the singularly important nature of this particular fight. but i do not think that all of this talk is just rhetorical flourish. rather, i think many people honestly believe that a single person on the supreme court could radically alter the politics and practice of abortion in america. and perhaps they are right.

but there is, i think, something very strange about this situation, and what is strange is how very undemocratic it seems. of course, the whole process is in many ways democratic: the president who makes the appointment was democratically elected, as are legislators who must vote to approve the appointment. and if the people do not like these appointments, they can vote against the people who make and approve them. at the same time, the justices are not elected directly, and once a justice is appointed he or she cannot be voted out. it is no secret that, for both of these reasons, the supreme court is the least democratic branch of our government.

what is strangely undemocratic about the current abortion situation, however, is not only that the decisions are made by people who were not directly elected and who cannot be voted out. it is also that there are only a handful of people making the decisions, which gives rise to the situation in which one person could be the deciding vote, thus giving the impression that the rights of millions (of women and/or unborn children) rest in the hands of a single individual.

it a curious thing, i think, that neither side of abortion side seems especially concerned to point out this undemocratic state of affiars. granted, there is a traditon of pro-life concern going all the way back to justice white's dissent in row which points out that the roe decision overturned the democratic majorities of the state legislators in an act of 'raw judicial power.' still, many pro-lifers today seem ready to let the court decide the issue, optimistic no doubt that they can win through the courts, with an overturning of roe v. wade possibly just around the corner. likewise, pro-choicers, no doubt recognizing that many, perhaps most, states would enact more restrictive abortion laws were roe overturned, seem eager to keep the abortion issue out of the legistatures and in the courts.

the undemocratic character of abortion politics in america strikes me as troublesome for several reasons. to begin with, it seems to stifle debate and information about the actual nature of abortion. when abortion become a 'court issue', it is easy for it to get drowned in legal-ese, to become something remote and abstract. but abortion is as concrete as any political issue could be -it is literally a matter of flesh and blood. surely, then, if there is disagreement among honest and thoughtful people, we ought to debate the issue in a way that is most open to the concrete realities, most responsive to local, communal, and personal concerns.

but the idea that the court has, or even could, simple 'decide the issue', gives rise to a kind of complacency in people's thinking -abortion becomes something for old people in robes to rule on, not something that can be understood and debated in the public square. moreover, that abortion has become a 'court issue' helps to explain, i think, why there has been so little productive debate on the issue; the nuances and complexities of argument are of little concern, because each side is simply holding out for the court to hand it victory (or reaffirm the victory handed to it earlier).

finally, and most generally, isn't there a value in debating and deciding the issue of abortion as communities, rather than handing the issue over to a few individuals and pinning our hopes on them? this value, i think, has something to do with the value of actually persuading our fellow citizens of what is right, rather than simply defeating them politically. this is something that martin luther king jr. seems to have understood: that a legal victory would be a hollow one unless accompanied by a transformation of heart and vision. thus real change must be democratic in a deep sense; not just a political or legal change, but an actually transformation of the δεμος, the people.