genders, values, norms
in the two weeks since my last post, i've had the good fortune of participating in several interesting conversations about gender. there were also some interesting things said in the comments on the last post. furthermore, i have been trying to do some more thinking on my own about the topic. in spite of all this, however, i'm still mostly at a loss for what to say on these issues.
in her comment on the last post, natalie expressed some skepticism about giving 'gendered' descriptions of the virtues. i share this skepticism. she asks: "where would such a description come from? and how would you protect against these lists being used normatively (as, historically, they always have)?" i think her concern about normativity may be instructive. in one sense, what i am trying to imagine is precisely a normative description of 'maleness' and 'femaleness', insofar as the description i am interested in is value-laden, and would play a role in our grammar of human excellence. i think we can distinguish this (general, vague) sense of normative from a sense of normative that conveys something like 'this is the only acceptable way of proceeding' or 'this is the best way of being.' i take it that natalie's primary concern is that gendered descriptions would be normative in the second sense.
a central worry about this kind of normativity has to do with saying that an excellence is both gender-specific and an expression of humanness. in particular, if we think of a certain trait as being expressive of 'masculinity', and also of that trait expressing something important about human excellence, then there seems to be some pressure to conceive of 'femininity' in a way that characterizes women as somehow less than fully human. i have in the mind the following sort of example:
i find in myself an association between a certain ideal of 'manliness' and decisiveness. (i am not saying i consciously endorse this ideal, but no doubt it exerts some influence on me). behind the value of decisiveness is, i think, the value of a kind of self-direction -the value of being not merely the subject of forces acting on oneself, but rather the origin of action. and what is involved in this kind of self-direction is closely connected to, or perhaps is even constitutive of, what goes into being an agent. to be self-directed, we might say, just is what it means to be a person; if one were fully the subject of forces, one would not be a self at all. now, if decisiveness is connected to 'manliness' then we seem dangerously close to an unwelcome implication: 'womanliness', especially if it is conceived as somehow the mirror image of manliness, may involve something less than being a full agent or self. of course, what corresponds to 'manly decisiveness' will probably not be described as 'womanly indecisiveness', but it may well be described in terms of 'receptivity' or 'passivity'. and the worry is that such descriptions push us toward regarding womanliness as expressing something less than full humanness, toward regarding women as less than full selves.
with these concerns about gender and normativity in mind, i have been trying to think about other ways of describing and evaluating value and may give some direction as to how to think about gender in a way that is value-laden but avoids such pitfalls. perhaps the case of architecture will be helpful. in describing various buildings, we can evaluate them with an eye toward their style or period. and it seems that different terms of praise will be characteristic of different style. for example, we may say that a certain gothic cathedral is ornate and grand, or that a particular church in the romanesque style is elegantly simple and quietly sturdy. interestingly, different terms can be ways of praising different buildings, even if the qualities they pick out are incompatible -e.g. we might praise one building for its lavishness and another for its sparseness. both of descriptions, however, are value-laden and both are positive. both pick out something of excellence and beauty in design and construction of the building. in the case of architecture, diverse and incompatible qualities can all express and embody value.
unfortunately, i'm not sure how to apply this example of value to the question of gender. nevertheless, there are several features of the case i find interesting. one is the way that the judgments of value are made relative to a particular style or period, and yet the judgments are all about the beauty of buildings -there are significantly differences in the standards of excellence, but it isn't that the subject has simply been changed. another interesting point is that we have no problem saying that architectural styles and periods were formed by historical and cultural forces, but recognizing that doesn't cause them to lose their value. we don't think the 'constructed-ness' of architectural styles and standards someone calls into question their beauty or value. i wonder if there isn't a hint here for thinking about gender that is neither 'essentialist' nor merely biological.
in her comment on the last post, natalie expressed some skepticism about giving 'gendered' descriptions of the virtues. i share this skepticism. she asks: "where would such a description come from? and how would you protect against these lists being used normatively (as, historically, they always have)?" i think her concern about normativity may be instructive. in one sense, what i am trying to imagine is precisely a normative description of 'maleness' and 'femaleness', insofar as the description i am interested in is value-laden, and would play a role in our grammar of human excellence. i think we can distinguish this (general, vague) sense of normative from a sense of normative that conveys something like 'this is the only acceptable way of proceeding' or 'this is the best way of being.' i take it that natalie's primary concern is that gendered descriptions would be normative in the second sense.
a central worry about this kind of normativity has to do with saying that an excellence is both gender-specific and an expression of humanness. in particular, if we think of a certain trait as being expressive of 'masculinity', and also of that trait expressing something important about human excellence, then there seems to be some pressure to conceive of 'femininity' in a way that characterizes women as somehow less than fully human. i have in the mind the following sort of example:
i find in myself an association between a certain ideal of 'manliness' and decisiveness. (i am not saying i consciously endorse this ideal, but no doubt it exerts some influence on me). behind the value of decisiveness is, i think, the value of a kind of self-direction -the value of being not merely the subject of forces acting on oneself, but rather the origin of action. and what is involved in this kind of self-direction is closely connected to, or perhaps is even constitutive of, what goes into being an agent. to be self-directed, we might say, just is what it means to be a person; if one were fully the subject of forces, one would not be a self at all. now, if decisiveness is connected to 'manliness' then we seem dangerously close to an unwelcome implication: 'womanliness', especially if it is conceived as somehow the mirror image of manliness, may involve something less than being a full agent or self. of course, what corresponds to 'manly decisiveness' will probably not be described as 'womanly indecisiveness', but it may well be described in terms of 'receptivity' or 'passivity'. and the worry is that such descriptions push us toward regarding womanliness as expressing something less than full humanness, toward regarding women as less than full selves.
with these concerns about gender and normativity in mind, i have been trying to think about other ways of describing and evaluating value and may give some direction as to how to think about gender in a way that is value-laden but avoids such pitfalls. perhaps the case of architecture will be helpful. in describing various buildings, we can evaluate them with an eye toward their style or period. and it seems that different terms of praise will be characteristic of different style. for example, we may say that a certain gothic cathedral is ornate and grand, or that a particular church in the romanesque style is elegantly simple and quietly sturdy. interestingly, different terms can be ways of praising different buildings, even if the qualities they pick out are incompatible -e.g. we might praise one building for its lavishness and another for its sparseness. both of descriptions, however, are value-laden and both are positive. both pick out something of excellence and beauty in design and construction of the building. in the case of architecture, diverse and incompatible qualities can all express and embody value.
unfortunately, i'm not sure how to apply this example of value to the question of gender. nevertheless, there are several features of the case i find interesting. one is the way that the judgments of value are made relative to a particular style or period, and yet the judgments are all about the beauty of buildings -there are significantly differences in the standards of excellence, but it isn't that the subject has simply been changed. another interesting point is that we have no problem saying that architectural styles and periods were formed by historical and cultural forces, but recognizing that doesn't cause them to lose their value. we don't think the 'constructed-ness' of architectural styles and standards someone calls into question their beauty or value. i wonder if there isn't a hint here for thinking about gender that is neither 'essentialist' nor merely biological.